Marx: Critical theory in great conflict with philosophical stances on same subject

The introduction to this critical analysis of Marx could not be better stated than by Marx himself.  I would like to examine here the reasons that Marx finds it so important to distinguish his theory from the previously expressed philosophies of his and previous times.  This critique will try to discover why Marx finds it so important to “debunk and discredit the philosophic struggle with the shadows of reality, which appeals to the dreamy and muddled German nation…” (pg. 176) and appeals to me.

It is easily found in the writings of Marx that he is a materialist rather than a mentalist.  “What [individuals] are coincides with their production, both what they produce and with how they produce.  The nature of individuals thus depends on the material conditions determining their production.”  (pg. 177)  Marx proceeds to explain the division of labor and how many things it separates: industrial/commercial from agricultural; town and country; then subsequently commercial from industrial; and (perhaps finally?) the division of labor inside various branches.  Why has Marx omitted the division between material and thought on this list?

“The production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness, is at first directly interwoven with the material activity and the material intercourse of men, the language of real life.”  (pg. 180)  This quote by Marx is the first time that he aligns thought with production, and hints at the possibility that thought can be considered a material good that might be included in his subsequent discussion.

Marx’s first premise involves human existence.  Secondly, the satisfaction of the first need leads to new needs.  Third, men remake their own life and propagate their kind.  Procreation can be, of course, material when it is examined biologically (consciousness of nature).  However, the transcendence of concepts like religious traditions that are outside of natural religion (a purely animal consciousness of nature) must be given some elemental ties to philosophy.  “The division of labor only becomes truly such from the moment when a division of material and mental labor appears.”  (pg. 184)  Marx tries to emancipate consciousness from the material world.  How can this be done in all instances?

The spirit can be found in material objects.  Such is the case with Shamanism where animals often host the spiritually intangible spirit.  The word of God is an interpretation of spirituality put to text and the Zondervan company makes quite a bit of tangible dollars off of its mass publication.  If spirituality is not a material object, is it then to be considered a force?

“Productive forces, capital funds, and social forms of intercourse… [are] the real basis of what the philosophers have conceived as ‘substance’ and ‘essence of man,’ and what they have deified and attacked.”  (pg. 189)  I would counter with the idea that philosophical thought in and of itself is a productive force.  Discourse is a social form of intercourse.  Why then does Marx state that it is “absolutely immaterial whether the idea of this revolution has been expressed a hundred times already”?  Toward the conclusion of the Communism and History section, Marx draws a connection to his four main points.  None of those points mentioned come anywhere near a brief description of how thought can be a productive force, or how ideas can be applied to the conditions of the rule of a definite class of society, or how thoughtful decisions might influence the distribution of activity, or how the communist consciousness manifests itself as a philosophical ideal in the minds of individuals.  Marx continues to focus on the tangible.

It must be accepted by everyone, philosopher or materialist, that man is a tangible being.  Yet Marx eludes to the fact that man sees himself as intangible.  “Man has found in the imaginary reality (religion)… the reflection of his own self.”  (pg. 71)  “Man makes religion.”  Doesn’t man make religion, then, in his own mind?  Therefore, and it seems to follow Marx’s logic, religion is an intangible product of man.  Man sees himself as intangible if he sees himself as a reflection stimulated by religion.  “This state, this society, produces religion’s inverted attitude to the world.”  Why does Marx consider this backwards thinking?  If man can criticize earth through science, cannot man criticize religion through philosophy?  I propose that thought is a tangible product of man and should be considered when discussing real relationships, problems, divisions, and elements that man must be aware of.

“You cannot transcend philosophy without realizing it.”  Marx eludes to philosophy being of some substance.  He then discusses Luther’s approach to religiosity and the liberation of man’s inner conscience.  If this conscience can be liberated, then it must be of material substance.  It must be a definite entity.

In conclusion, I have not drawn the precise certainty that Marx is in conflict with philosophy and religion as substantive.  I do not see Marx’s materialist stance in direct opposition with the perception of the abstract.  There are no divisions to be drawn here between material and thought.  Ideas can be discussed as substantive matter.  Therefore, I will continue to analyze Marx’s tendency to focus on a materialistic philosophy as not conflicting with a transcendental mentalist view.  I, however, have not come to the precise determination that either are completely valid.  Strict empiricism cannot produce universal discourse on any subject.  It is vital to perceive the material and immaterial simultaneously.  Although this is not the main focus of the selected writings of Marx, it is a discussion on a series of critical questions derived from the readings.